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0. H. BROWNLEE
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
I INTERPRET my assignment to be to indicate very generally the role
of rationing governmental services by the price mechanism and of
financing the provision of such goods and services at least partially
from "sales receipts" rather than rationing these services according
to criteria other than price and financing their provision from general
revenue sources.
In cases in which the price mechanism can be employed, it is
possible to assure that no one pays for services that he does not
consider to be worth the price and that anyone can obtain service
providing that he is willing to pay the cost. At least some of the
ambiguity in statements about our "needs" for public services can
be eliminated.
Although I favor using price as a rationing device wherever a
reasonable opportunity exists, I believe that the appropriate area
for application of market pricing to the determination of how much
of various goods and services government should produce is a
relatively small one. Opportunities undoubtedly exist for financing
such items as fire and police protection partially on the basis of
service actually rendered. Nevertheless, such cases would be relatively
insignificant in terms of the over-all pattern of public expenditure.
I see few major services that ought to be financed exclusively from
sales revenue that are not already being financed in this way.
However, the criteria currently used for establishing prices and for
determining how much to produce are not necessarily the best ones.
Furthermore, charges at less than cost might well be established for
some services that are now provided free.
My criteria for evaluating whether a service is being rationed
appropriately and whether the amount produced is optimal do not
include the effects upon the distribution of income. If agreement
could be reached with respect to how various income distributions
should be ordered, the best one could be achieved independently
of the production pattern of government services.
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1.
Avirtue of rationing services by the price mechanism is that such
a procedure permits obtaining information regarding how users
value these services relative to other things that they might obtain.
Together with appropriate cost information, such demand data would
permit one to determine whether too little or too much of a service
was being produced. For services which have no external economies
or diseconomies in consumption or production, i.e., the consumption
level of one person does not enter directly as a variable in the utility
functions of other persons and the production level does not affect
the physical productivities of resources in other uses, setting the
price equal to marginal production cost and noting whether there
is excess demand or excess supply can, under certain conditions,
tell one whether too little or too much is being produced—provided,
of course, that the optimal level of output is not zero. If there are
external economies or diseconomies in production or consumption,
services still might be allocated by the price mechanism, but the
optimal amount to produce would not be that at which price is equal
to marginal cost.
The validity of these assertions and the conditions which must
prevail in order for them to be used as the basis for good rules to
guide resource allocation are well known. I will not reproduce the
"proofs" here. Instead let me try to indicate their applicability to
determining which services should be "priced" and how the resulting
pattern might compare with the existing one.
2.
Amongthe goods and services that should not be priced are those
currently labeled by economists as "public" or "community"
goods, i.e., those which can be consumed by one person without a
reduction in the quantities available to others.' "Voluntary" contri-
butions for the support of such activities will not necessarily be
si.ifficient to obtain the best amounts of them, since there seems to be
no reasonable way of inducing persons to reveal their true preferences
1Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," The Review of
Economics and Statistics, November 1954, pp. 387—9; Stephen Enke, "More on the
Misuse of Mathematics in Economics: Rejoinder," ibid., May 1955, pp. 131—3; Julius
Margolis, "A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," ibid., November
1955, pp. 347—9; Samuelson, "Diagramatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expendi-
ture," ibid., November 1955, pp. 350—6; Samuelson, "Aspects of Public Expenditure
Theories," ibid., November 1958, pp. 332—8.
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for such goods relative to others. Although there is no unanimity
with respect to which services fall in this class, expenditures for
defense and associated activities fit this classification and bulk large
in the over-all expenditure pattern.
At the other pole is the class of services produced under conditions
of constant or increasing marginal production cost and of a character
such that there are neither external economies nor diseconomies of
production or consumption associated with them. These should be
rationed by price (or a mechanism comparable to the price
nism), and the output at which the market clears when price is equal
to marginal cost is the appropriate one to produce. For the most
part, such services are not produced by government except in cases
where the cost of collecting from users in accordance with quantities
used is high relative to production costs. However, there is no
inherent reason why government should not produce such goods
providing that it attaches appropriate values to the resources that
are used in production, allows for the restrictions that it imposes
upon private producers in determining costs and does not cover
losses from general tax revenues. That one or more of these con-
ditions would be violated is not unlikely.
In between these two extremes are those services which have
external economies in consumption and/or decreasing marginal
production costs leading inherently to monopoly. Those with
pronounced external economies in. consumption generally have been
produced by government; those with obvious increasing returns
generally have been subject to regulation.
3.
A detailed description of governmental services which can be
classified accurately according to the three categories suggested—
"public goods," services with pronounced external economies in
consumption and/or production, and services which should be
priced at marginal cost—is not readily available. However, a cursory
examination of aggregate data suggests the following somewhat
crude allocation of some of the major service categories: (Table 1,
on following page.)
The above classification is somewhat arbitrary and does not reveal
the things that are of interest in determining whether services are
being produced in appropriate quantities. Although it is a picture
for only one short period of time, this picture is not an atypical one.
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TABLE 1





a. General government 1.7
b. National defense, including atomic 48.6
energy, USIS, mutual security, State
Department, and research and
development
c. Health, hospitals and medical 2.4
(largely veterans)
2. State and local governments




c. Health, hospitals and welfare
(I)Welfare 3.4
(11) Hospitalsb 3.2
B. Services with pronounced external economies








a. Postal service 4.1 4.0
b. General aids to business 0.2
c. Higher education Ø45C
d.Highways 1.0
2.State and local governments
a. Higher education 1.5 0.4
b.Highways 7.8d 4.Oe
c.Public utilities 3.5 2.9
d. Liquor stores 0.9 1.1
a Data for the federal government are for 1960, and are from Executive Office of the
President, The Federal Budget in Brief, Fiscal year 1960. Those for state and local
governments are for 1957 and are from State and Local Government Finance in 1957,
Bureau of the Census, February, 1957.
b Police and fire protection as well as hospitals contain a component that is clearly
not in the category of "public goods." However, I prefer to err on the side of making
the category of saleable goods too small rather than too large.
° Included in state and local expenditure and should not be counted separately.
Includes some capital expenditures that should not be charged exclusively to
current services.
e Estimated. 1955 fuels taxes and auto, truck, and bus registration fees were $3.65
billion.
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Of particular interest is that (1) there are no "sales receipts" from
services that benefit both the users and other parties (i.e., have
pronounced external economies in consumption)—although some
such receipts probably should be attributed to sanitation—and (2)
there is a substantial amount of support from general tax funds for
a service that I have classified as one that should be sold at marginal
cost—higher education. Included in the expenditures for this service
are those for research, so that all of the difference between expendi-
tures and receipts should not be attributed to higher education.
Nevertheless, I believe that nearly everyone agrees that tuition
receipts at publicly supported institutions of higher education are
less than the costs that reasonably could be allocated to the teaching
function.
Even though expenditures and receipts are approximately equal
for the postal service and may be approximately equal for highway
services—if capitalexpenditures were accurately estimated—it
does not follow that these services were produced in the optimal
amounts since their prices were somewhat arbitrarily determined
and the cost computations probably omitted imputed property
taxes and underestimated capital costs.
4.
As I asserted earlier, the fact that a service has external economies
associated with its consumption does not imply that it should not
be priced. Consider some of the implications of pricing the services
of elementary and secondary schools.
Elementary education is a commodity that is believed to have such
important effects upon persons other than those who obtain it that
it has been made not only free but compulsory. To make persons pay
for something which they may not wish to consume generally
would not be considered desirable. However, there may be decided
advantages to widening the choice of what might be consumed; and
there are potential gains from inducing suppliers to minimize the
cost of producing whatever they produce. Combining payments
to persons conditional upon these payments being spent upon
elementary education with institutional arrangements whereby any
entrepreneur who meets certain minimum production requirements
is qualified as a seller could further both of these objectives.2
2SeeMilton Friedman, "The Role of Government in Education," included in Robert
A. Solo, ed., Economics and the Public Interest, Rutgers University Press, 1956.
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Adoption of such a proposal would not answer the question, "Are
we spending the correct amount upon education ?"butit would
provide a more satisfactory answer to the question of whether that
which was being made available was being provided at minimum
cost.
Services that benefit persons other than the immediate users could
be offered to users at a price below marginal cost or a subsidy could
be provided to users, as was suggested above in the case of elementary
education. The latter procedure appears to me to be preferred in that
it permits a greater element of competition among suppliers. Thus
rather than directly providing innoculations, medical examinations,
etc., the government might give each person a minimum grant
conditional upon its being used for such purposes and let the person
select his own supplier.
5..
Letme now turn to the potentialities of the pricing mechanism
for determining the appropriate production levels for highway
services and higher education. The former service is one that many
persons contend ought to be priced; the case for pricing the latter
is less generally accepted.
In this discussion I shall not consider the problems of city streets.
The metropolitan transportation problem is one of congestion
together with pronounced external diseconomies in consumption
to some urban residents. The purely mechanical problems of charging
tolls for the use of the Street system along with the space-saving
features of mass transport suggest subsidization of bus and subway
transportation on a large scale. My concern, however, is with the
so-called trunk highways and rural roads.
The benefits from investment in such highways have properties
such that a highway investment can be evaluated in the same manner
as can any investment designed to produce goods and services that
are to be sold. To speak of highway services as if they constituted
a single homogeneous commodity is to err in the same way as to
speak of food as a single good. I will avoid discussion of how such
services should be defined except to assert that sdme of our diffi-
culties in analyzing highway problems arise from inappropriate
definitions of highway service. Traveling a particular distance, at a
given speed and with given comfort and safety may be as different—
in the mind of the highway user—from traveling this same distance
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at another speed and with other degrees of comfort and safety as
a pound of sirloin steak is from a pound of potatoes. Truck travel
differs from auto travel, etc.
Although there are many different kinds of highway services,
nearly all of them benefit the highway user—in the case of services
provided by passenger car travel—or the benefits are passed on to
other persons from whom a collection can be made—through
commodity prices, in the case of truck services—in the same way
as are the benefits from technological improvement or additional
capital used in a farm or factory. In general, highway services are
like food in that one person has no interest in another's consumption
pattern (except for its effect on prices).3 The case for distributing
highway services and for determining their appropriate levels of
output by a price-cost mechanism is as strong as that for any other
commodity group.
The statement that the distribution and production of highway
services should be guided by price-cost criteria does not mean that
we should set up toll stations at every street corner and every cross-
road. Because of collection costs and inconveniences that may be
more distasteful than congestion, toll roads can play a very limited
role in the highway system. However, in principle, one could establish
an over-all fee schedule of motor fuel taxes, weight-distance taxes,
license fees, and other charges which would yield a rational allocation
of whatever road and street facilities were available. And, we could
account for costs and revenues so that we could get about the right
amount of highway investment and distribute it fairly well geo-
graphically. In fact, the structure of charges to highway users already
may be fairly reasonable and actually improving, although we are
without some of the information required to construct a good fee
catalog. The provision of facilities probably is less rational, relatively
speaking, than is the fee schedule, although we can only make rough
guesses about this from existing data.
Except on toll roads, the basic charge for the passenger auto is
That different degrees of highway congestion are not all equally satisfactory to a
highway user might appear to nullify the assertion that one man's consumption is of
no concern to other men, and vice versa. However, if we consider travel at one speed,
safety, etc., as a different commodity from travel at another speed, safety, etc., there is
no contradiction in the formal statement. More congestion is analogous to the higher
price for steak that would result from an increase in its demand. The highway user would
be indifferent to some higher fee with lower congestion and the low fee with more
congestion.
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the• motor fuels. tax.4 Fuel consumption is an index of distance
traveled for any vehicle, although distance traveled and amount of
service are not uniquely related as long as highways and speed of
travel differ. However, to account for highway quality differences by
differences in fuel taxes probably is not feasible. Since passage for
the passenger auto is the least costly to provide, the fuel tax can be
used as a kind of toll. Special fees for passenger cars may be warranted
in large cities where congestion is a problem, such fees being in
accordance with the higher costs of providing a given level of service
in areas where land values are high. Similarly, special assessments
or special license fees for residents of very sparsely settled areas
may be advisable. In this case, such fees are in accordance with the
high value of the service rendered by the highway.
For trucks and busses, fuel taxes are supplemented by license fees
in recognition of the differences in costs imposed by passage of
vehicles of different characteristics. However, license fees cannot
be varied sufficiently to tax equitably the many different classes of
weight and distancecombinations.Weight-distancetaxesare
preferable and could permit different fees for different routes. In
fact, weight-distance taxes might be administered in a manner
similar to that used in collecting the personal income tax from self-
employed persons. Estimates of tax liabilities to be incurred during a
year might be filed, and taxes paid on this basis. Differences between
actual Wand estimated liabilities could be settled at the end of the year.
Some of the implications of using price-cost comparisons to a
greater extent in making highway decisions are of interest.
1. If prices and costs are appropriately determined, not only the
highway system as a whole, but each separate entity should "pay
for itself" in an accounting sense when the system is optimal.5
Otherwise sectors of the system that are "making a profit" and
ought to be expanded may be supporting sectors that ought to be
contracted. This possibility cannot be detected when only the
revenues and costs of the system as a whole are examined.
Data relative to the demand for highway services as well as to the costs of providing
them are not adequate for determining what prices to establish.Engineers are un-
decided as to whether a highway designed to carry heavy axle loads can carry passenger
cars at zero marginal maintenance and construction cost. Economists generally would
argue that a highway having such characteristics is "overdesigned," i.e., the capital
investment is excessive.However, if such a relative cost relationship actually exists
andcongestion costs are zero, passenger car operators should pay only for the privilege
of using the highway—i.e., license fees.
Because of indivisibilities, equality between imputed revenues and imputed costs
may not be achievable.
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That highway users should pay for the highways has much, though
not universal, support. However, that each clearly distinguishable
sector should pay for itself is less widely supported—except possibly
for toll roads. In particular, it is my belief that generally there has
been relative overconstruction of rural nontrunk highways, although
this belief can neither be adequately supported nor refuted with
existing data.
2. The prices that have to be paid for resources are taken as
reliable estimates of the value of the product that has to be sacrificed
in order to expand production of one good. Government pays the
same prices for labor and materials as do other users. However, it
borrows money at more favorable terms (at a lower rate of interest)
than does the typical private borrower. This lower interest rate
reflects primarily the confidence of the lender in government's
ability to repay—not in the relative merits of the projects. Govern-
ment can tax (or print money, if it is the federal government) to
repay loans. Private borrowers must repay out of earnings. If govern-
ment borrows at, say, 3 per cent, whereas private producers borrow
at, say, 6 per cent, and both government and private producers use
amounts of capital such that rates of return are equal to borrowing
costs, government will be using too much and private producers too
little. Shifting capital from the government to the private sector
would expand total product. Government also should not invest in
projects unless they would yield, say, 6 per cent, if capital is to be
allocated in the best manner. Thus, decisions to build highways
andto makeother governmental investments should not be based
on the rate at which government can borrow but on the rate of
return on capital in other uses.°
3. Tax differentials, as well as differentials in costs of borrowing
affect the relative prices of governmentally produced goods in
comparison with privately produced goods. In the transportation
field are special excise taxes affecting some kinds of transport (but
not others) that encourage use of the highway system rather than
alternative forms of transportation. These taxes ought to be
abolished. However, there are also property taxes applying to nearly
all private property. I do not consider a complete evaluation of the
property tax to be appropriate for this discussion. However, to obtain
See Arnold C. Harberger, "The Interest Rate in Cost-Benefit Analysis," included in
Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Joint Economic Corn-
mittee, 85th Cong. 1st sess., 1957, pp. 239—41.
429USER PRICES VS. TAXES
a better distribution of resources among various kinds of trans-
portation, imputed property taxes on highways ought to be considered
in arriving at highway costs, just as a "shadow" interest rate equal
to the marginal rate of return on capital in private investment rather
than the cost of borrowing ought to be employed.
To try to make my last two points clearer, imagine that there are
two services—call them "rail transport" and "highway transport"—
both of which could be produced at the same constant unit costs, if
resource prices were the same to both industries. Assume also that
the amount of either service demanded varies inversely with its price
and directly with the price of the competing service. With the same
interest charges and no taxes, the prices would be identical and
certain amounts of each service would be produced. However, if one
industry were charged more for capital than was the other and also
had to pay taxes proportionate to the volume of service produced,
its service would be priced higher than that of the other industry.
Less of it and more of the other would be used than would be
economic, i.e., than would be the case if "true" costs determined
prices.
It should be noted that if the highways were to "pay for themselves"
in the sense of yielding revenues equal to costs, including the imputed
ones, there would be diversion of highway revenues to the general
governmental fund. This diversion would be equal to imputed
property taxes plus, say, 2 or 3 per cent of capital outlays—this 2
or 3 per cent being a rough estimate of the differences in borrowing
costs to government and private borrowers.
4. Although it is not economically feasible to collect tolls except
on a very small percentage of the highway system, tolls can be
equitable rationing devices and can permit accurate accounting of the
revenues attributable to a particular sector of the highway system.
For these reasons, rather than minimizing the number of toll roads,
I would employ them wherever feasible. However, certain practices
in administering toll roads are not consistent with best use of the
highway system. In particular:
a. requiring that toll roads pay for themselves out of tolls is
uneconomic. Motor fuels tax receipts also should be credited the
toll roads. To do otherwise will result in underutilization of such
roads and overutilization of, or overinvestment in, freeways.
b. tolls should be much more flexible than toll authorities have
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been inclined to make them in the past. Varying tolls with the
demand would smooth the traffic flow and could make it approxi-
mate more closely that for which the road was designed. Ideally,
tolls might fluctuate as do the odds at parimutuel betting booths or
stock market quotations. In areas such as Manhattan where access
is by tunnel or bridge, tolls to the island certainly should exceed
those away from the island during the morning rush hours, and vice
versa during the evening hours.
Fluctuations in tolls not only would aid in controlling traffic
flows, but also would permit improved estimates of the demand for
highway services. Such data are required for determining how much
investment to make in highway facilities, and very few of them are
available.
The service, higher education, is obtained by consumers because of
its impact upon earnings—in which case it can be treated as an
investment good—or because the knowledge is desired for its own
sake—in which event it can be treated as a consumption good. In
either event, I believe that investing in such education is like investing
in any other capital asset and that the consumption of higher
education by one person does not enter other persons' utility
functions.
The statement that one person's consumption of higher education
does not enter the utility functions of other persons is an assertion
without either adequate proof or disproof. Some persons state
flatly that they prefer to live among persons that have attended
colleges or universities and that they are willing to pay to increase
the number of such persons. Others believe that college trained
people make "better citizens" and hence that support from general
funds is warranted. This latter contention could be tested by analysis
of such items as memberships on civic committees, attitudes on
certain public issues where basic value premises are identical, etc.
I believe that such analyses would show that, after standardization
for such factors as native intelligence and incomes, there are no
significant differences between persons with and persons without
higher education However, this belief may be contradictory to fact.
If my belief is correct, state colleges and universities should
receive support from general tax sources only for research, tuition
should be raised to cover instruction costs, and the terms under which
people can borrow to invest in education should be the same as those
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under which they can borrow to make other kinds of investments.
I am not the sole protagonist of this general proposal and it has by
now been widely enough voiced so that I need not develop it further.7
We have little information about the demand for educational
services so that I can not make a good guess about what the pattern
would be if such a proposal were put into effect. However, one would
expect the distribution of education to be altered somewhat. Persons
now attending college but not willing to pay the full costs would not
attend; and persons willing to pay the costs but not now able to
obtain funds would attend college. Also one would expect the costs
of providing a given level of service to be reduced. Most important
of all, the question of whether we need more facilities for higher
education could be answered more satisfactorily than it can be at the
present time.
6.
Allocating government services by pricing them has limited
applicability. To me, an appeal of the price mechanism is that it
provides information that would permit us to settle some debates
about whether an expenditure is too large or too small. The use of
prices in guiding how to produce a given level of service is an area
that has not been discussed here. It also offers possibilities for
improving resource allocation.
COMMENTS
E. CARY BROWN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
In general, I agree with Mr. Brownlee's view that pricing is of
limited applicability in the governmental sector. Practically, what
prices should be charged even in the limited areas where they seem
feasible is, however, a baffling question.
1. It is difficult to go beyond the general but empty principle
that the best use of resources requires that marginal social benefit
be equated with or exceed marginal social cost. Discussions of how
this principle should be implemented run into trouble. The usual
beginning is the view that the pricing system can perform admirably
when there are no externalities in production or consumption nor
increasing returns to scale in the particular •industry in question.
See Milton Friedman, op.cit., for example.
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From there on, depending on value judgments about governmental
activity, we find assertions about the demand and cost conditions of
various commodities that I find unconvincing.
Consider the following statements of Mr. Brownlee:
"In general, highway services are like food in that one person has
no interest in another's consumption pattern. .." (p.427).
"In either event, I believe...thatthe consumption of higher
education by one person does not enter other persons' utility
function" (p. 431).
While these views may mirror Mr. Brownlee's tastes, they are un-
likely to mirror everyone's. I would be interested in knowing how
he reached such a general conclusion.
One piece of evidence I can offer is that other people's consumption
of these two commodities does affect my utility. The satisfaction I
derive from a social system is a function of its quality. In a tightly
knit society such as ours, the quality of that society will depend on
the education of its members, directly through the kinds of laws it
enacts, if in no other way. I have, therefore, a considerably greater
interest in other people's consumption of public education, both
higher and lower, than I have in their consumption of oats, peas,
beans, and barley.
My second assertion is that there may be extraordinarily large
external diseconomies from the consumption of highway services
that sometimes fail to be reckoned in. Otherwise attractive landscapes
have been hideously scarred by roads; ugly strips of gasoline stations,
eatingjoints, and billboards have moved such men as De Voto to
crusade against them; hikers, cyclists, and the like have been driven
off our streets; our cities are crowded with cars, fumes, and smog,
and cluttered with stoplights, parking meters, and road signs;
macadam glades bedizen factory and shopping center. Indeed,
will the American future be that of a land flattened completely by
bulldozers and embedded in a few feet of concrete, thus permitting
auto travel by optimal great circle routes? To treat the output of
highway services and higher education in the same way as the output
of lollypops seems to me remarkable.
2. Some of our sharpest debates in public finance have been over
such excise taxes as those on tobacco, an industry that perhaps is
characterized by relatively few externalities. What is the best output
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for this industry, whether operated privately or publicly? There are
an infinite number of excise taxes, bOth positive and negative, and
consequent prices that could be charged to consumers in this situ-
ation. Surely, it is not obvious that price equal to marginal private
cost would necessarily be best. That depends on the unresolved
argument regarding consumer sovereignty. Much of our debate in
this sphere is whether or not price is a proper measure of marginal
benefit—whether smokers are not just harming themselves.
3. That leads to the next point—the removal from discussion by
Mr. Brownlee of distributional considerations in the choice between
user prices and taxes. Both from a pedagogic and theoretic point of
view, there is much merit in separating distributional from efficiency
considerations. Since, in theory, a system of lump-sum taxes and
subsidies can distributionally bail out any price configuration,
attention can be directed either toward the rationing function or the
distributional function of prices. Much can be learned from this
instructive exercise, provided the rules of the game are not confused
with those of the real world. For here, there simply do not exist
nondistorting taxes and transfers that can make appropriate distri-
butional adjustment. Indeed, the feasible political alternatives may
be very limited. It is necessary, therefore, to appraise both distri-
butional and efficiency considerations in any realistic political
situation. Unfortunately, we must be satisfied with second best.
It may be a closer approach to an optimal situation to employ the
price system to redistribute income, even though a divergence
between marginal rates of transformation and marginal rates of
substitution may result, than it would be to make price decisions
on the assumption that somehow the proper distribution of income
will be achieved by other social policies. We must, therefore, make
interpersonal comparison of utilities.
4. Now, suppose we do wish to follow marginal-cost pricing.
Mr. Brownlee would have cost computations based not on the
interest cost of funds to the government, but instead on the rate of
return on capital in alternative uses. He refers approvingly to
Harberger's study in this connection. I find myself in general agree-
ment with this view, but do not reach the same policy conclusion as
he reaches. He considers, for example, the case in which the govern-
ment interest cost is 3 per cent and the private rate is 6 per cent. As
I understand it, he would charge the 6 per cent rate against govern-
ment projects, rather than the 3 per cent rate. Yet if, as Brownlee
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says, the differential interest cost of 3 per cent is attributable
"primarily [to] the confidence of the lender in the government's
ability to repay—not on the relative merits [or riskiness] of the
projects," should not the 3 per cent rate be used in private projects
rather than the other way round?
The government rate presumably reflects the greater pooling of
risks, just as in the private sphere we find many different borrowing
costs depending on size of firm and its ability to combine risks.
In an ideal world would it not be desirable for all investment decisions
to be made on the basis of a rate of interest from which was absent
a premium for lender's risk? Is it obvious that we would move closer
to an optimum by saddling all investment decisions with this premium,
rather than taking steps to reduce or eliminate it? True enough, there
may be underinvestment in the private sphere because marginal
private cost exceeds marginal social cost. But is it clearly incorrect
for the government to base its decisions on the pooling gains from
scale that it achieves? One would find, I expect, that, if lender's
risk were fully eliminated, the government interest cost might be
raised somewhat higher than the 3 per cent rate. But I fail to see why
it should move all the way to the private rate.
Even were private interest cost the proper rate touse,the
empirical rate indicated by Brownlee and Harberger seems to me to
be overstated for two reasons. One is the failure to distinguish
between marginal and average rates. The other is the inclusion of
yields on equity capital grossed up by the profits tax. If the interest
cost of the government and of large business concerns were compared,
not nearly as large a differential is found as the ones they use.
I also have the uneasy feeling that inclusion of the property tax
in the computation results in imposition of the same distorting
effects in the public sphere that we find in the private sphere. Such
a movement does not necessarily lead us toward an optimum.
Granted that there has been much loose thinking about criteria
for governmental investment decisions, Brownlee and others have
performed a real service by emphasizing the relevant factors. But
it may be a disservice to overcorrect the governmental decision.
The application of frictions present in private investment decisions
to governmental decisions may worsen things, not improve them.
5.Economistsmust ever be alert to the advantages of the price
system. But we may not be adding to social output if we insist on its
inevitable advantages when these depend only on particular value
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judgments applied. In the area of user prices versus taxes, where the
interpersonal comparison of utility is required, and where our choice
must be between second best alternatives, an agnostic posture would
seem to conform more closely to the present state of our knowledge.
C. HARRY KAHN, Rutgers University
As Mr. Brownlee suggests, the division between services with
pronounced external economies (Category B) on the one hand, and
saleable services (Category C), on the other, is apt to be somewhat
arbitrary. I think thisis not primarily because of any lack of
"detailed description of governmental services" but rather in the
nature of the classifications chosen. The arbitrariness is introduced
because the services listed in Category B are apparently considered
not saleable because of their pronounced externalities whereas
Category C-services are presumed to have no externalities and to
be produced under conditions of increasing or constant marginal
production costs and therefore saleable.
Actually such a dividing line is well-nigh impossible to draw.
Almost all the services under B and C can be sold and have exter-
nalities. Category C, as defined, is practically nonexistent as Brownlee
himself notes (p. 425).Fewservices produced by government have no
external economies or diseconomies or increasing returns to scale.
On the contrary, one or the other is usually the reason for govern-
mental performance. Can it be shown that externalities are greater
for sewage than for the postal service and highways (not to speak
of higher education)? And are higher education and highways
"saleable" in the same sense as liquor?
In short, I suggest that the difference between B and C is one of
degree rather than kind, and that a simpler and more useful
procedure would be to list all of the services in Brownlee's B and C
categoriesas "saleable services," ranked in descending order accord-
ing to the degree of external economies associated with each service,
and hence in ascending order according to the degree of saleability.
Such rankings wouldstillinvolve considerable judgment and
arbitrariness, but at least an arbitrary conceptual division would be
removed.
Can all government services then be subsumed under either the
public goods or saleable category? I would find it useful and con-
venient to add a third, "redistributive expenditures." Practically
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all government expenditures have, of course, incidental redistri-
butive effects, but for some the stated purpose is clearly redistri-
butive. Among others, welfare expenditures and veterans services
would fall into this category. Such services are, almost by definition,
not saleable, and they can hardly be considered public goods if one
defines them—as Brownlee does—as goods which can be consumed
by one person without a reduction in the quantities available to
others.
The merit in dividing government expenditures into public,
saleable, and redistributive groups is thus that the dividing lines are
sharp and meaningful.
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